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POLICE REFORM AND THE JUDICIAL 
MANDATE 
Julian A. Cook, III* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to a crisis that threatens his tenure as Mayor of 
Chicago, Rahm Emanuel announced in December 2015 reform 
measures designed to curb aggressive police tactics by the Chicago 
Police Department (CPD).1  The reform measures are limited, but 
aim to reduce deadly police-citizen encounters by arming the police 
with more tasers, and by requiring that officers undergo de-
escalation training.2  Though allegations of excessive force have 
plagued the department for years, the death of Laquan McDonald, 
an African-American teenager who was fatally shot by Jason Van 
Dyke, a white officer with the CPD, was the impetus for the 
Mayor’s reforms.3  McDonald was shot sixteen times.4  Dash cam 
footage revealed that McDonald was holding a small knife and, in 
contravention of reports prepared by Van Dyke and several other 
police officers, was walking away from the officers at the time of 
the shooting.5  
In January 2016, the Mayor also announced that Charles H. 
Ramsey, former Police Commissioner of the Philadelphia Police 
Department, and former Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police 
                                                                                                                   
 *  J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Chip George, Hannah Heltzel, Jonathan Weeks and the members of the Georgia Law 
Review for their outstanding assistance in the preparation of this Essay. 
 1 Dan Hinkel, Emanuel Touts Tasers, Training to Cut Chicago Police Shootings, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 31, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-ch 
icago-police-training-1231-20151230-story.html. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Jeff Coen & John Chase, Top Emanuel Aides Aware of Key Laquan McDonald Details 
Months Before Mayor Says He Knew, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune. 
com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-met-20160113-story. 
html. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818698 
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Department of Washington, D.C., was hired to serve as a 
consultant to the City on matters pertaining to “policies, training 
and accountability” in regards to police use of force, community 
interaction, and community policing.6  Ramsey will also interact 
with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), which 
announced in December 2015 that it would commence an 
investigation into the CPD’s policing practices.7  During his terms 
in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., Ramsey invited DOJ 
review of the police practices in those cities.8  Recently, Ramsey 
served as a co-chair of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing, which was established by President Barack Obama in 
May 2015 to develop recommendations to help curb aggressive 
police practices.9 
Emanuel’s reform measures have been met with skepticism.  It 
has been noted, for example, that CPD officers have carried tasers 
for many years, and despite the expanded use of the devices since 
2010, there has been no “immediate” decrease in police shootings.10  
And while many experts deem police de-escalation training to be 
beneficial, they argue that without effective supervision and 
identifiable measures to ensure officer accountability, such 
training might be of limited value.11    
Irrespective of the merits of these criticisms, police reforms, 
such as those announced by Emanuel, face a prospect for sustained 
success that is daunting.  This Essay will explain why decisions 
rendered by the United States Supreme Court since the close of 
the Warren Court era in 1969, argue against the prospect of 
positive, sustained remedial change, and why meaningful, 
enduring police organizational improvements will be difficult to 
                                                                                                                   
 6 Patrick M. O’Connell, Former Chicago Officer Returns to Advise Department on Civil 
Rights Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 24, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/break 
ing/ct-chicago-police-senior-advisor-met-20160124-story.html. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.; PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 81 (2015). 
 10 Hinkel, supra note 1. 
 11 Id. 
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achieve absent the adoption of an expansive standing doctrine and 
a reinvigorated exclusionary rule.  In making this argument, I will 
examine the DOJ’s employment of consent decrees as a mechanism 
to force positive remedial change, and explain why judicial 
oversight—an inherent aspect of the consent decree remedial 
process—is essential to the achievement of effectual police reform.   
II.  THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT ON POLICE 
ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICE AND A PROPOSED REMEDIAL MEASURE 
The Warren Court was notable for its expansive interpretation 
of individual liberties.  Though not as well-known as its landmark 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, which required the rendition of a 
set of warnings prior to any police custodial interrogation,12 the 
Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio,13 a Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule case, was arguably just as influential.  In 
general terms, the exclusionary rule provides that evidence 
obtained in violation of the Constitution cannot be used at trial.  
Prior to Mapp, this rule had been applicable only in federal 
courts.14  But Mapp extended this prohibition to the states, and 
concluded that exclusion was a constitutional mandate.15  
Also during the Warren Court era, the pool of individuals 
eligible to challenge allegedly unconstitutional government 
investigative conduct was much broader than it is today.  In Jones 
v. United States,16 the Supreme Court declared that standing to 
contest the constitutionality of police conduct could be achieved by 
demonstrating that the claimant was legitimately on the premises 
of the search, had an established privacy interest, had a 
possessory interest in the item that was seized or searched, or was 
the target of a government investigation.17   
                                                                                                                   
 12 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 13 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 14 Id. at 654 (citing Elkins v. United States, 369 U.S. 206 (1960)). 
 15 Id. at 655. 
 16 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
 17 Id. at 261, 263–67. 
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However, since the close of the Warren Court, individual 
liberties have been scaled back significantly, and the exclusionary 
rule and the standing doctrine have not escaped the Court’s 
pruning.  Many exceptions to the exclusionary rule have 
developed, with the good faith doctrine unquestionably the most 
significant development in this regard.18  The exclusionary rule, 
once considered an embedded part of the Fourth Amendment, is 
now a rule of last recourse.  Today, it is invoked only when 
meaningful deterrence of police misconduct can be achieved.19 
Similarly, the standing doctrine has also been significantly 
winnowed.  The principal standing threshold is the privacy test, 
which requires that a claimant demonstrate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area of the search.20  No longer can 
the standing threshold be satisfied by proof of a defendant’s 
possessory interest in the evidentiary item seized or searched, by 
demonstrating his legitimate presence on the premises of the 
search, or by showing that he was the intended target of a 
government investigation.  Concomitantly, investigative freedoms 
of the police have become increasingly liberated in the post-
Warren Court years.21  
Police organizations pay attention to pronouncements from the 
Supreme Court that impact their investigative function.  
Cognizant that their investigative powers have increased, and that 
their failure to comply with constitutional safeguards will 
frequently be overlooked, it is inevitable that many police 
                                                                                                                   
 18 See generally, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340 (1987); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 
(2009).  
 19 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. at 144. 
 20 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143(1978). 
 21 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (holding that search warrant 
applications be assessed pursuant to a totality of the circumstances approach); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that officers may perform a full search of a 
person incident to arrest); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that an 
officer may properly stop a motorist upon probable cause of a traffic violation, even if the 
stop was pretextual); Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that an officer 
does not violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights when a motorist is arrested for a 
minor traffic offense that is punishable only by a fine).    
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organizations will become emboldened by their broad investigative 
freedoms.22  Thus, when the Supreme Court grants officers 
significant latitude to perform their investigative function, and 
willingly forgives their constitutional missteps, it should come as 
no surprise when officers capitalize on these investigative 
freedoms and cross constitutional boundaries.  And when 
constitutional safeguards are crossed, it should also not be 
surprising when some officers get overly aggressive, and when 
some get way too aggressive.  Such a steady stream of pro-law-
enforcement pronouncements inevitably contributes to an 
aggressive culture of policing, and further expands the divide that 
exists between law enforcement entities and the communities 
which they serve. 
When Emanuel announced his reforms for Chicago, he 
referenced the culture of policing and the need to positively alter 
this atmosphere.23  On an earlier occasion, he also made reference 
to a “code of silence” among officers,24 which refers to a practice, all 
too prevalent in law-enforcement circles, of shielding fellow officers 
from their misdeeds.25  Indeed, this practice was evident in the 
McDonald case when five officers prepared reports that 
corroborated Van Dyke’s now-discounted version of the events 
surrounding the shooting.26     
                                                                                                                   
 22 Also relevant are the extensions of immunity protections, such as that enjoyed by 
states pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution and that enjoyed by 
individual officers by virtue of qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982). 
 23 Hinkel, supra note 1. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See, e.g., Jason Meisner & Annie Sweeney, Case Spotlights Code of Silence Among 
Chicago Police, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-p 
olice-code-of-silence-conviction-met-20151216-story.html (explaining the code of silence in 
Chicago); Matt Pearce, Jury Rules Chicago Police ‘Code of Silence’ Protected Felon Cop, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/14/nation/la-na-nn-chicago-police-
code-silence-20121114 (explaining how the code of silence covered up a case of police 
brutality).  
 26 Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ From Video in Death of Laquan McDonald, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/officers-statements-differ-
from-video-in-death-of-laquan-mcdonald.html.  
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Resistance to challenge and change is entrenched within many 
law enforcement organizations, not just that in Chicago.27  Thus, 
meaningful and sustained reform to policing practices will be 
difficult to achieve when the accomplishment of this objective is 
dependent upon the good will of police organizations.  As a matter 
of logic, the police will not relinquish their investigative freedoms 
granted them by the Supreme Court, including their ability to 
breach constitutional standards, on their own volition.  
Accordingly, for meaningful cultural change within police 
departments to take hold, there must be a threat of judicial 
sanction.     
I have advocated elsewhere that police cultural change begins 
by establishing a robust third-party standing doctrine and 
reinvigorating the exclusionary rule.28  The core of my standing 
proposal is this: not only must criminal defendants be afforded the 
opportunity to contest police investigative practices when their 
reasonable Fourth Amendment privacy interests have been 
violated, but they should also enjoy this opportunity when the only 
privacy rights that have been violated belong to third-parties.29  
Thus, when the government seeks to admit evidence against a 
defendant that it obtained by virtue of an unconstitutional search 
of a third-party, the defendant should be afforded the opportunity 
to challenge that government practice.30  The ability to have your 
claim heard in court provides the judiciary with an opportunity to 
impose a remedy.  To effectuate meaningful police reform, not only 
must the courts be empowered to exclude unconstitutionally-seized 
evidence far beyond what is currently authorized by Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, but a criminal defendant’s ability to seek 
judicial redress must be dramatically expanded.31  And when 
police organizations become cognizant of the vast landscape of 
                                                                                                                   
 27 See, e.g., infra note 57. 
 28 See generally Julian A. Cook, III, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Critique of the President’s Task Force’s Final Report, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 106 
(2016). 
 29 Id. at 112–14. 
 30 Id.  
 31 Id. 
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eligible challengers to their investigative practices, as well as the 
judiciary’s expanded ability to exclude ill-gotten evidence, law 
enforcement will have little choice but to change its culture to 
meet this new reality.32    
While an expansive standing doctrine and robust exclusionary 
rule will certainly produce positive change, they are no panaceas.   
Police resistance to reform will manifest, even against the threat 
of judicial sanction.  Lessons from the consent decree context are 
instructive in this regard.  For example, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) 
empowers the DOJ to pursue civil actions against government 
units when it has reason to believe that a police agency has 
engaged in a “pattern or practice” of violating individual 
constitutional protections.  Specifically, the law provides: 
(a) Unlawful conduct 
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or 
any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a 
governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or 
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by 
officials or employees of any governmental agency with 
responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice 
or the incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or 
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. 
(b) Civil action by Attorney General 
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause 
to believe that a violation of paragraph (1) has 
occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of 
the United States, may in a civil action obtain 
appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to 
eliminate the pattern or practice. 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id. 
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Often, in lieu of bringing a civil action (or even after the 
commencement of a civil action) the DOJ and the targeted city will 
enter into a consent decree, which is a settlement negotiated 
between the government and the city, approved by a court, and 
aimed at reforming troublesome police practices and policies.33  In 
the event of non-compliance, a court may impose equitable relief.34   
Yet, even in this context, police resistance has hardly been 
uncommon.35  Consider the consent decree entered into between 
the United States and the City of Seattle.  In March 2011, the DOJ 
commenced an investigation of the Seattle Police Department’s 
(SPD) policing practices, and determined, as detailed in its final 
report submitted on December 16, 2011, that it had “reasonable 
cause to believe that” the department “engages in a pattern or 
practice of using unnecessary or excessive force in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”36  On July 27, 2012, the DOJ and the City of 
Seattle entered into a consent decree (as well as a Memorandum of 
Understanding) in order to address the government’s findings.37  
Despite disagreement with the DOJ’s assessment, the City entered 
into the agreements because “it wish[ed] to ensure that its police 
                                                                                                                   
 33 Eugene Kim, Vindicating Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Guidance From 
Procedures in Complex Litigation, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 773 n.37 (2002). 
 34 Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015). 
 35 See id. at 1376 (noting that it is common for police unions to attempt to participate in 
settlement talks between the DOJ and the cities in order to prevent the adoption of reform 
measures “that may increase oversight or otherwise burden frontline police officers”); Elliot 
Harvey Schatmeier, Reforming Police Use-of-Force Practices: A Case Study of the 
Cincinnati Police Department, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 539, 550 (noting that “rank-
and-file officers are often hostile to [memorandums of agreements] because they see the 
terms as a challenge to their professionalism, unnecessary and ineffective oversight, and 
penalty for honest police work”). 
 36 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of Resolution, United States v. Seattle, 
No. 12-CV-1282 ¶ 15 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425 
b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542d82a2e4b0e604b756e932/1412268706512/DOJ_Settlement_Agr
eement.pdf. 
 37 SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT: COMPLIANCE & PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, http://www. 
seattle.gov/police/compliance/ (last visited May 27, 2016). 
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department is functioning at an exceptional level and that it has 
positive relationships with all its communities.”38 
The consent decree contains numerous remedial provisions, but 
of particular note are its sections addressing the excessive use of 
force.  The decree emphasizes de-escalation practices, officer 
training, and a comprehensive system of documenting and 
investigating instances when the police have employed force.39  It 
further details policies on stops and frisks pursuant to Terry v. 
Ohio,40 as well as discriminatory police practices.41  Merrick Bobb, 
the Executive Director of the Police Assessment Resource Center, 
was appointed as a Monitor.42  He is tasked with the responsibility 
of assisting the SPD with the implementation of the agreed upon 
reforms, providing progress reports to the court and the public, 
and offering an assessment regarding whether the SPD has 
achieved full compliance with the terms of the agreements.43  
In his Sixth Semiannual Report, submitted in December 2015, 
Bobb found that the SPD had made meaningful progress towards 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Order of Resolution, United States v. Seattle, 
No. 12-CV-1282 ¶ 17 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425 
b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542d82a2e4b0e604b756e932/1412268706512/DOJ_Settlement_Agr
eement.pdf. 
 39 Order Approving Parties’ Updated Use of Force Policies, United States v. Seattle, No. 12-
CV-1282 ¶¶ 70(h), 72 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2015), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b 
9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/55b69606e4b057b59452f21b/1438029318148/Order+Approving+Updat
ed+UOF+Policies.pdf.  See also SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.100 DE-ESCALATION 
(effective date Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---us e-of-force/8100--
-de-escalation; SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.200 USING FORCE (effective date Sept. 1, 
2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/820 0---using-force; SEATTLE 
POLICE DEP’T MANUAL: 8.400 USE OF FORCE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION (effective date 
Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-8---use-of-force/8400---use-of-force-re 
porting-and-investigation. 
 40 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 41 Memorandum Submitting Consensus Seattle Police Dep’t Policies and Order 
Approving Same, United States v. Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542ae2d3e4b01c971776b
b9b/1412096723782/118_Memo_Submitting_Consensus.pdf.   
 42 The Seattle Consent Decree: How it Came About, What it is, and What the Monitor 
Does, SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, http://www.seattlemonitor.com/overview/ (last visited May 
29, 2016). 
 43 Id. 
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fulfilling its obligations under the consent decree.44  He 
commented that “Seattle has come to be seen as a national model 
on how to address fundamental issues relating to use of force, 
stops and detentions, and bias-free policing.”45  Indeed, U.S. 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch noted this progress during a visit 
to Seattle in September 2015.46  Yet, these positive developments 
have not come without resistance, particularly during earlier 
stages of the consent decree.   
In the Monitor’s First Semiannual Report, submitted in April 
2013, Bobb stated that though the SPD had taken positive steps 
towards compliance, the department “still does not speak with one 
voice.”47  Bobb referenced internal “fighting up and down the 
command staff level” and that the department “does not appear 
settled on a unified vision of what it is to become.”48  He added 
that many individuals “within the union-organized ranks, remain 
‘dug in’ and continue[ ] to resist the force and implications of the 
Settlement Agreement.”49  And he further declared that “[t]he time 
has come for [all the] persons in the [SPD], and particularly those 
with influence and authority, to move past their disagreements 
with [the] DOJ and to get on with reform.”50 
Similar frustration was expressed in his Second Semiannual 
Report, filed in December 2013.  Noting the existence of 
“intransigence” as well as “an aversion to innovation,” Bobb found 
that the SPD “has not made nearly as much progress during this 
                                                                                                                   
 44 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, SIXTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://static1.squarespa 
ce.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/56c346b301dbaeb4caf65d84/1455638196035/Sixt
h+Semiannual+Report--12-15-15--FOR+FILING.pdf. 
 45 Id. at 1. 
 46 Mike Carter & Steve Miletich, U.S. Attorney General Lynch Lauds Seattle Police for 
Reform Efforts, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 24, 2015, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/s 
eattle-to-receive-15m-federal-grant-to-fight-human-trafficking/. 
 47 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT 5 (2013), http://static1.square 
space.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542c0a37e4b0801eab71294c/1412172343193/
Seattle_First_Semiannual_Report_Final.pdf. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 6. 
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period as the Monitoring Team knows to have been possible.”51  He 
stated that the SPD failed “to fully and fairly analyze officer-
involved shootings” and noted the department’s “[p]atent attempts 
to narrowly restrict the scope of the inquiry, to improperly coach 
officer testimony, and to definitively stack the odds against a 
proceeding that would determine . . . whether the shooting was 
inconsistent with policy.”52  He also expressed serious reservations 
regarding the prospect of the SPD ultimately fulfilling its consent 
decree obligations, stating: 
It appears to the Monitoring Team that a struggle 
wages on at the upper command level for control of 
policy related to the Consent Decree . . . . [S]uccessful 
implementation of the Consent Decree requires all of 
the command staff to join ranks, end resistance to the 
Settlement Agreement, and embrace reform.  If the 
current senior command staff remains in place and 
their attitudes toward the Settlement Agreement do 
not change, the SPD is unlikely to be able to achieve 
full and effective compliance with the Consent 
Decree.53 
Also, in May 2014, more than 100 Seattle police officers, 
detectives, and sergeants filed a civil rights complaint against the 
Attorney General, the City of Seattle, the Chief of Police of the 
SPD, and Merrick Bobb, among others, complaining, inter alia, 
that the policies and practices delineated in the consent decree 
“unreasonably restrict and burden [their] right to use force 
reasonably required, to protect themselves and others, from 
apparent harm and danger.”54  This action was later dismissed.55   
                                                                                                                   
 51 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, SECOND SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1 (2013), http://static1.square 
space.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/542adfabe4b0957885ec6029/1412095915929/
Second+Semiannual+Report+--+Final.pdf. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 6. 
 54 Complaint at 2, Mahoney v. Holder, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1215 (W.D. Wash. May 28, 2014) 
(No. C14-0794), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1175039-complaint.html. 
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Unquestionably, the problem of aggressive policing is complex 
and requires a diverse set of remedial approaches.  One of the 
lessons from the Seattle decree experience is that positive change 
is facilitated when police department chiefs and other individuals 
of influence exhibit a good faith commitment to the reform process.  
Bobb cited this development as a critical factor in the successful 
reform efforts in that city.56  However, Seattle is also instructive as 
to another set of realities: namely, that police resistance to reform 
is not uncommon, that it can arise even in contexts involving 
judicial oversight, and that it can seriously impede the process of 
reform.57  
III.  CONCLUSION 
When consent decrees produce positive police reforms58 a host of 
explanatory rationales underlie such outcomes.  Commitment to 
reform among law enforcement leadership, as noted earlier, is 
unquestionably a critical factor, as is the ability and willingness of 
a city to finance the remedial settlement, and the identification of 
appropriate benchmarks by which to assess police department 
                                                                                                                   
 55 Steve Miletich, Judge Dismisses Suit by SPD Officer On Use-of-Force Reforms, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 20, 2014, http://blogs.seattletimes.com/today/2014/10/judge-dismisses-
suit-by-spd-officers-on-use-of-force-reforms/.  
 56 See SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1–5 (2014), http:// static 
1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/548f45e6e4b0767ae18867c4/1418675
686394/Fourth+Semiannual+Report.pdf (noting “solid progress to date” of police 
department compliance); SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FIFTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT 1 (2015), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5425b9f0e4b0d66352331e0e/t/557f3f8fe4b0e62e4460ff9
b/1434402703419/Fifth+Semiannual+Report.pdf (aiming for “full and effective compliance 
with the Consent Decree”); SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, supra note 44, at 1 (noting the 
department’s “unflagging commitment to police reform”).  
 57 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 34, at 1416 (noting that Oakland has been cited as an 
example of police leadership that has conflicted with government efforts to achieve reform 
by means of a consent decree); Joe Domanick, Police Reform’s Best Tool: A Federal Consent 
Decree, THE CRIME REPORT, July 15, 2014, 5:29:38 AM, http://www.thecrimereport.org/ne 
ws/articles/2014-07-police-reforms-best-tool-a-federal-consent-decree (noting resistance to 
consent decrees in Oakland, Cincinnati, New Orleans, and New York City).  
 58 See Rushin, supra note 34, at 1359–64 (noting studies that concluded that consent 
decree reform efforts in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and Los Angeles have produced successful 
results). 
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progress.59  But another critical influence—the judiciary’s 
oversight of the police reform process—is no less central to 
successful police reform efforts.  In Bobb’s Fourth Semiannual 
Report, he observed that the consent decree cannot end unless the 
court “certif[ies] that SPD had reached ‘full and effective 
compliance’ with the various commitments, requirements, and 
terms set forth in the Consent Decree.”60  He added,    
The full scope, and precise contours, of “full and 
effective” compliance may at this juncture look 
different depending upon one’s angle or perspective.  
The Parties are engaged in ongoing discussions about 
the contours of “full and effective” compliance.  
Notwithstanding such discussions, and while the 
Parties’ views remain useful, it is clear that it is the 
Court, with input from the Monitor, that determines 
what compliance is.61 
Bobb’s comments reflect an important understanding on the 
part of the DOJ and the SPD regarding the judiciary: judicial 
oversight is a mainstay for the duration of the decree and that the 
court is the ultimate adjudicator regarding compliance.  The 
parties understand that self-policing is not an option in this 
context.  Indeed, it was the inability of the police to effectively 
police itself that prompted the initial DOJ investigation and 
eventual consent decree.  In the absence of sufficient incentives, 
even the best-intentioned police organizations will find it difficult 
to implement and maintain meaningful reform measures.62  That 
                                                                                                                   
 59 See Simone Weichselbaum, The Problems With Policing the Police, TIME, http://time. 
com/police-shootings-justice-department-civil-rights-investigations/ (last visited May 29, 
2016) (describing how costs of reforms and adequate benchmarks have been problems in 
police reform processes).   
 60 SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, FOURTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 56, at 7. 
 61 Id. (emphasis added). 
 62  See, e.g., Weichselbaum, supra note 59 (noting the recurrence of policing problems in 
Cleveland, Miami, New Jersey, and New Orleans, despite earlier agreements with the DOJ 
to implement reforms).    
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is why a remedy to the problem of aggressive police practices 
necessitates an active judicial role.   
A robust standing doctrine, alongside an expansive judicial 
mandate to exclude evidence obtained by virtue of a breach of a 
constitutional safeguard, can help adjust police organizational 
culture and improve officer behavior on the ground.  The 
persistent oversight of the judiciary and the accompanying threat 
of judicial sanction are among the vital linchpins to the 
achievement of beneficial and long-lasting change in police culture 
and practice.  In contrast to the consent decree context, where 
judicial oversight of policing practices terminates upon a court’s 
determination that full compliance with the decree has been 
achieved, judicial oversight in the exclusionary rule context has 
greater permanence.  It stands to reason, therefore, that the dual 
reforms advocated for in this Essay—empowering a broad base of 
individuals with standing to challenge government investigative 
practices, and a substantive judicial mandate to exclude 
unconstitutionally seized evidence—is a logical place to start the 
arduous process of police reform.  
